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Critical genocide studies has emerged as an important strand of scholarship devoted to interrogating
the core assumptions of the field of genocide studies. Drawing on the intellectual traditions of
Frankfurt School critical theory as well as deconstruction, among other approaches, this scholarship
has provocatively explored various methodological limitations in current research, including biases
in case selection, problems with the comparative case method, definitional debates, and reductive
formulations of perpetrator motivations, among other issues. Informed by critical genocide studies,
this article sketches a critical approach to modern atrocity prevention.1 Although contemporary
atrocity prevention has made significant advances, I lay out several areas where a critical approach
can be applied fruitfully. The paper puts forth a critical approach to prevention that is self-reflective,
dialectical, multivalent, and anti-teleological.
Part I provides a brief overview of contemporary prevention theory, which I identify as rooted
within a broadly liberal normative orientation. Part II elaborates the four elements of the proposed
critical approach toward prevention. Part III uses the critical lens to examine several important
assumptions in current atrocity prevention.
Two preliminary points of clarification follow. First, a caveat. We should not be seeking to
prevent genocide per se, which is insufficiently wide to capture the scope of significant human
rights violations that any prevention theory should encompass. Genocide prevention implies
that the object of prevention is one specific kind of collective harm, the intentional destruction
of groups as such, when in fact the field of critical genocide studies is concerned with a range of
widespread collective violence. The focus, I contend, should be on the prevention of large-scale and
severe harms against civilians. A somewhat more inclusive formulation is “atrocity crimes,” “mass
atrocities,” or just “atrocities,” which include the crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, as well as ethnic cleansing.
In reality, the prevention community often uses the terms genocide and atrocities
interchangeably but normally means the latter.2 Here, I use the term atrocities, though it makes
sense to maintain the term critical genocide studies as our starting point, if only to highlight
the intellectual origins of critical approaches within genocide research that seek to expand and
problematize scholarly inquiry.3
Second, a point about the article’s focus: I examine atrocity prevention, which has been shaped
and enriched by genocide studies scholarship but also other scholarly fields and practitioner
communities. Examining only prevention in the narrower orbit of genocide studies4 literature
misses many of these developments, and in any case atrocity prevention is now sufficiently well
developed and sophisticated to warrant critical investigation on its own. In this article, prevention
means those strategies, policies, and practices directed toward anticipating and arresting the onset
of atrocities prior to their occurrence or reoccurrence.5 The appropriate range of strategies, policies
1

In addition to various scholarly sources and government, intergovernmental organizations and NGO reports and studies
noted in these footnotes, this paper is partly based on 38 semi-structured interviews with prevention practitioners
for an ongoing project, “The Scholar-Practitioner Nexus in Atrocity Prevention,” which examines current challenges
in prevention work and areas where scholarly research can assist the prevention community. Quotations from
respondents are cited as “Nexus Project” below. I also draw on occasional work consulting with the United States
government, foreign governments, and various human rights organizations.

2

Ernesto Verdeja, “Predicting Genocide and Mass Atrocities,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 3 (2016), 13-32.

3

Alexander Laban Hinton, “Critical Genocide Studies” in Genocide Matters: Ongoing Issues and Emerging Perspectives, eds.
Joyce Apsel and Ernesto Verdeja (New York: Routledge, 2013), 42-58.

4

Genocide studies is a heterogeneous and interdisciplinary field, but useful critical histories are available in Donald
Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, eds., Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Adam
Jones, ed., New Directions in Genocide Research (New York: Routledge, 2012); Joyce Apsel and Ernesto Verdeja, eds.,
Genocide Matters: Ongoing Issues and Emerging Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2013). Also see the journals Genocide
Studies and Prevention and Journal of Genocide Research.

5

Adam Lupel and Ernesto Verdeja, eds., “Responding to Genocide,” in Responding to Genocide: The Politics of International
Action, eds., Adam Lupel and Ernesto Verdeja (Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 2013), 7.

Ernesto Verdeja. “Critical Genocide Studies and Mass Atrocity Prevention” Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, 3 (2019): 111-127.
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and practices requires a broader historical and geographical horizon than is typically found in
current atrocity prevention.
Part I
Modern atrocities prevention largely espouses a liberal normative orientation. This includes a
commitment to liberal values such as human equality, freedom and democratic accountability;
support for the human rights regime found in the United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and institutionalized through a rule of law system enacted by various international
treaties, conventions, laws, and norms; acceptance of an international community composed
of sovereign states and formalized in the UN and various regional organizations; and, a global
governance architecture that curtails use of violent force through procedures for adjudicating and
solving conflicts between countries. This set of claims is liberal in its emphasis on core civil and
political rights and the rule of law, and insofar as it is meant to be binding on all nations. It remains
the dominant orientation of prominent global human rights organizations and actors.
Contemporary atrocity prevention has evolved within this liberal orientation, becoming
increasingly professionalized and sophisticated over the past two and a half decades. Although
its origins can be traced at least to the end of World War II and the moral shock of the Holocaust,
contemporary prevention theorizing and practice emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War and
the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides. The establishment in 1994 of the Carnegie Commission
on Preventing Deadly Conflict, tasked with addressing “the looming threats to world peace of
intergroup violence” and developing “new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly
conflict,” helped center attention on the protection of civilians in a new way.6 In 2001 the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty released its report, The Responsibility to Protect,
as an answer to Secretary General Kofi Annan’s call to renew UN efforts to stop mass atrocities. That
report reformulated the relationship between national sovereignty and human rights through the
responsibility to protect (R2P) norm, and provided a rearticulation of the legal, political and moral
justifications for more robust prevention and intervention strategies. The UN General Assembly’s
subsequent endorsement of a revised version of R2P has entrenched the norm, if imperfectly, in
international politics.7 Additionally, the establishment in 2004 and subsequent expansion of the
UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect has helped secure the place of
atrocity prevention in the highest reaches of the human rights firmament.
Contemporary international atrocity prevention now benefits from a confluence of factors:
the marked expansion of the UN’s peacebuilding portfolio; the spread of human rights in global
political discourse; the development of advanced graduate programs in peacebuilding, conflict
resolution, humanitarianism and related fields; a professionalized international human rights
community; private and foundation funding sources for prevention; and, a rise in the number
of foreign ministries in the global north that advocate human rights in their work. Current
prevention work consists of extensive cross-fertilization between scholarship and practice, and a
substantial amount of research is driven by concrete policy questions or challenges.8 Much of this
is characterized by policy work that emphasizes not only conflict termination and resolution but
also the promotion of individual human rights, the rule of law, liberal democracy, and a market
economy.
The Atrocity Prevention Lens
As the Budapest Centre for Mass Atrocities Prevention has noted, there at least four reasons
for adopting an atrocity prevention lens as distinct from conflict prevention, the latter of which

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict Final Report (New York: Carnegie
Corporation of New York, 1997), 9.
7
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: ICISS, 2001);
United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1 (October 24, 2005), para. 138-140.
8
Craig Zelizer, ed., Integrated Peacebuilding: Innovative Approaches to Transforming Conflict (Boulder: Westview, 2013).
6
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largely addresses violent conflict between armed actors.9 First, mass atrocities may occur outside
of regular armed conflict or continue once a ceasefire has been concluded.10 Although atrocities
outside of armed violence comprise a minority of situations, they are still sufficiently common
to warrant the development of atrocity prevention strategies distinct from traditional conflict
resolution. Second, mass atrocities are by definition crimes, and thus always illegal. The same
normative condemnation does not hold for all conflicts, where the legality of the use of violent force
is sanctioned and controlled (in principle, if not in practice) by international law. Third, prevention
does not stop when the killings start, even if the scope of action is severely limited; there may be
opportunities to reduce civilian suffering and provide assistance, even if armed conflict is ongoing.
Fourth, preventing atrocities entails developing forecasting tools and violence escalation models
that do not necessarily track directly with forecasting armed conflict. Governments may repress
civilian populations without facing any armed resistance, and thus mainstream conflict prevention
theories are not easily applicable.11
Given these justifications for a focus on atrocities as distinct from armed conflict, what are
the primary elements of modern liberal atrocity prevention? Although specific terminology and
conceptualization may differ, contemporary atrocity prevention has settled on a relatively stable
set of practices.12 Current prevention is typically divided into two general areas, structural and
operational.13 The former focuses on the long-term prevention of harms, such as by conducting
risk assessments, promoting liberal democracy, addressing profound economic and political
inequalities, fostering the rule of law, encouraging integration into the global capitalist economy,
and supporting human welfare and development, among other strategies. Operational prevention
concerns situations where atrocities are occurring or likely to do so. Strategies may include early
warning monitoring, diplomatic pressure on leaders, peace negotiations, economic sanctions,
humanitarian assistance for vulnerable populations, and at its extreme, military intervention.14
A third area concerns preventing the recurrence of atrocities, and it is largely the purview of
transitional justice, political reconciliation, and long-term societal peacebuilding. Within each area,

9

Conflict prevention includes a broad range of incentives and threats, such as trade and economic enticements, political
recognition, economic sanctions, military coercion, and threats of legal prosecution, to get parties to the negotiating
table and agree to stop fighting. A common formulation of armed conflict in this work posits a bell-shaped cycle
with distinct stages. Although the details differ across cases, the basic stages are well established: absence of conflict;
latency; emergence; escalation; stalemate; de-escalation; resolution; and, peacebuilding. The conflict cycle model has
the benefit of parsimony and clarity, and because of this it has proven remarkably durable. It has been employed
extensively to make sense of myriad post-World War II conflicts through the present with the aim of identifying the
various points where de-escalation and even conflict resolution may be possible. I. William Zartman and Alvaro de
Soto, Timing Mediation Initiatives (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010); Louis Kriesberg and Bruce
Dayton, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012).

10

Alex Bellamy, “Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications for the Responsibility to
Prevent” (Muscatine: The Stanley Foundation, 2011).

11

Budapest Centre, “What is Mass Atrocities Prevention?”, n.d., accessed October 24, 2018, http://www.
genocideprevention.eu/what-is-mass-atrocities-prevention/.

12

For an overview, see James Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging Our Responsibility to Prevent Genocide (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016); Madeline K. Albright and William S. Cohen, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S.
Policymakers (Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2008); Sabrina Stein, Atrocity Prevention in
A Nutshell: Origins, Concepts and Approaches (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2016); United States Agency
for International Development, Field Guide: Helping Prevent Mass Atrocities (Washington, DC: United States Agency for
International Development, 2015); United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect,
Framework for Analysis of Atrocity Crimes (New York: United Nations, 2014); Alex Bellamy, Mass Atrocity and Armed
Conflict; Scott Straus, Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention (Washington, DC: United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum, 2016); European Union Policy and Planning Unit, The Early Warning and Conflict Prevention
Capability of the Council of the European Union, (Initiative for Peacebuilding, March 2010), accessed October 13, 2018,
http://www.ifp-ew.eu/pdf/0611prelisbon.pdf; Helen Fein, Human Rights and Wrongs (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers,
2007).

13

Some scholars also identify a distinct domain of systemic prevention, concerned with transnational factors of violence,
though in practice this is largely focused on terrorism, arms sales, and international crime. See Adam Lupel and
Ernesto Verdeja, Responding to Genocide, 7.

14

James Waller refers to upstream and midstream prevention strategies to capture this distinction, with downstream
referring to “post” violence situations. Waller, Confronting Evil, 135-210.
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the set of available strategies may be more or less coercive to incentivize changes in behavior,
and not all strategies will be employed. Over twenty years of research and practice have helped
hone and fine-tune them, and the available mix illustrates the development and maturation of
prevention thinking.15
We now have better understandings of the short and midterm drivers of violence, greater
knowledge of the primary indicators of onset, and awareness of the importance of supporting
“upstream” prevention efforts.16 Nevertheless, the dominant atrocity prevention lens contains a
number of limitations which have practical consequences. These limitations require critical scrutiny,
and include: the displacement of global and regional contextualization in favor of the nation-state
as the object of analysis and treatment; the overlap between prevention and securitization; limited
conceptualizations of violence; the emphasis on expert knowledge above concrete, embedded,
localized and historical knowledge; and, highly selective engagement with civil society and local
actors. I explore each of these clusters of limitations in more detail below. First, however, I sketch a
critical approach to prevention, which helps provide the conceptual framework for the subsequent
discussion.
Part II
The critical approach presented in this section is meant as a perspective by which to assess current
atrocity prevention thinking and strategies. Although there are many valuable points in current
atrocity prevention work, adopting a critical perspective highlights certain lacuna as well as ways
forward.
The points I make below are critical in two ways: first, in the narrow sense that they are informed
by the work of the intellectual tradition of Critical Theory and the scholars of the Frankfurt School.
Although these thinkers did not write extensively on international politics, their commitment
to emancipatory, historically grounded social theory that is firmly rooted in empirical research
provides an important analytical orientation for prevention. They distinguished themselves from
approaches based on abstract moral philosophy (which tends to posit ahistorical, universal values,
such as “natural rights”), as well as reductive social scientific methods that treat empirical facts
as “given” while ignoring interpretive questions or the particular perspectival limitations and
biases of the observer. A foundational text remains Max Horkheimer’s 1937 essay, “Traditional
and Critical Theory,” which lays out three important markers of this approach.17 For Horkheimer,
a critical theory is normatively committed to human emancipation, and thus rejects as untenable
the fact-value distinctions dominant in the social sciences; it adopts a wide range of social scientific
methods combined with philosophical critique (in other words, it is rooted in social theory, not
idealist philosophy); and, it is tasked with showing how transformational change can occur. It is
therefore not merely aspirational, as is common in some leftist utopian political thought. Indeed,
genocide scholars have already adopted such a critical perspective in their work.18
The points below are critical in a second, wider sense: they amount to a perspective that is
explicitly normative, dialectical, and attuned to how power relations shape social analysis and
practice while also hiding their contradictions and tensions.19
In line with these general claims, I propose a critical genocide studies approach to prevention
that is self-reflective, dialectical, multivalent, and anti-teleological. Below I present what this means.
15

Sheri P. Rosenberg, et al., eds., Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

16

An excellent discussion of these various strategies is found in James Waller, Confronting Evil.

17

Max Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, eds. Max Horkheimer and
Matthew J. O’Connell (New York: Continuum, 1995), 188-243.

18

Mathias Thaler, Naming Violence: A Critical Theory of Genocide, Torture and Terrorism (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2018); Salwa Ismail, The Rule of Violence: Subjectivity, Memory and Government in Syria (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2018); A. Dirk Moses, “Toward a Critical Theory of Genocide Studies,” Mass Violence and Resistance
– Research Network, April 18, 2008, accessed August 1, 2018, https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacreresistance/en/document/toward-theory-critical-genocide-studies.

19

I draw on the Frankfurt School’s social theory because it makes these points sharply. However, my general points
are broadly compatible with a host of other critical theories that share many of the same attributes. See Razmig
Keucheyan, The Left Hemisphere: Mapping Critical Theory Today (London: Verso, 2013).
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Self-reflective: Self-reflectivity involves adopting a theoretical stance where the researcher
remains aware, and interrogates, her own positionality. This means several things. First, and
rather obviously, this entails recognizing that there is no value-neutral analytical position, say
for assessing the causes of violence or the means of prevention. In other words, it rejects an
unexamined neutrality still dominant in many areas of the social sciences. As a first step it means
examining how the methods one employs – whether qualitative, quantitative, interpretive or
various mixed approaches – and their various assumptions shape the perception of a research
question, design and execution. Of course, neutrality of that kind is hardly the problem for liberal
prevention scholars or practitioners – they do not hesitate in condemning genocidaires and war
criminals, and are instead quite explicit about their normative commitments. But self-reflectivity
is important in a second sense: it consists of questioning the prima facie authority of the human
rights expert (scholar, diplomat, activist, etc.) who may make a claim to grasp the problem of
violence and the appropriate response (e.g., by providing the “theory” of genocide, the “theory”
of prevention), and who is thus authorized to determine what a society in crisis needs. To be selfreflective is to confront how any analysis of violence, and the prevention plan that follows, always
includes a set of normative claims and assumptions that cannot be theorized away or held at bay.
Given these constitutive biases in interpretation, the researcher should be committed to critiquing
both the presuppositions of theories as well as the status of the expert speaker – and this holds
for critiquing one’s own positionality as expert in addressing these issues. This does not mean a
rejection tout court of expertise or accumulated knowledge based on sound research – far from it.
Rather, a critical, self-reflective perspective invites cultivating epistemic humility: if we remain wary
of comprehensive, ‘scientific’ understandings of violence, and thus the seduction of speaking for
all, we are enjoined to take much more seriously the claims, knowledge and authority – the practical
agency – of local prevention actors. Self-reflection demands an openness to those claims, and thus
authority, of multiple agents, as well as engagement with the disruptions and uncomfortable truths
that this may entail.20
Dialectical: This involves several components. First, the prioritization of relational analyses of
concepts and phenomena, rather than treating them in isolation of one another. A dialectical approach
posits that concepts are defined and shaped in relation to one another, and thus it is these relations,
and subsequent changes to relations, that require special attention. A dialectical approach, in
other words, historicizes concept formation and theoretical claims. Thus, it is skeptical toward
the reductive reification of concepts as 1) comprehensive explanatory factors (e.g., ethnic war,
ideology, etc.), 2) identity categories (e.g., Hutu v. Tutsi, moderate Hutu, spoilers, bystanders,
etc.), and 3) outcomes (e.g., successful prevention, stability, reintegration, peace, reconciliation,
etc.). Naturally, any social theory of change, including one about violence and peace, must employ
concepts to understand otherwise highly complex and oftentimes confusing social and political
processes. Concepts allow us to make sense of complicated dynamics and shifting contexts and
they structure our analyses. However, a tendency toward conceptual reification in prevention
work risks producing analyses that posit as true what in fact are parsimonious proxies for reality.
A dialectical approach also helps highlight hidden tensions and exclusions in analysis and practice.
It can challenge, for example, otherwise sharp, categorical distinctions between “political” violence
and common crime, and help us understand how violence can be displaced from one social domain
to another, such as how previously political violence may become routinized quotidian violence
after a peace accord is signed and security personnel join criminal enterprises.21 We miss these
displacements if we only employ discrete analytical categories of violence and fail to assess their
dialectical relationships to each other.
Multivalent: A critical prevention approach is multivalent. It resists efforts to maintain
prevention to one level of analysis, be it the so-called “international community,” national elites,
or domestic governance institutions, and instead it takes as its starting point the interconnection
20

James DeShaw Rae, Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice in East Timor (Boulder: First Forum Press, 2009).

21

Victoria Sanford and Martha Lincoln, “Body of Evidence: Feminicide, Local Justice, and Rule of Law in ‘Peacetime’
Guatemala,” in Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities After Genocide and Mass Violence, ed. Alexander
Laban Hinton (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 67-94.
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of multiple analytical levels: global, regional, national and subnational. Framed this way, we can
examine a host of questions important to prevention: How are violence dynamics at different levels
linked theoretically and empirically? Under what conditions are national or subnational conflict
dynamics exacerbated by broader global and regional structural factors, reinforce one another, or
follow some other interactive pattern? To what extent, and how, do shifts in global structures of
power and “different world-historical contexts produce different patterns or extents of genocide”?22
By identifying such linkages and causal processes, we may be able to locate new prevention actors,
tools and strategies.
Anti-teleological: Lastly, a critical approach does not assume a certain patterned unfolding or
endpoint of social processes. Critical genocide studies scholars have rightly critiqued the dominant
modernization theories that equate societal advancement with the spread of liberal democracy, free
markets and Enlightenment values, for downplaying histories of genocide and slavery on which
Western progress was built - what Hegel called the slaughter bench of history.23 The conceit of
developing sophisticated and teleological theories of historical change is occasionally reproduced
in prevention work at smaller scales, where paradigmatic “conflict cycle” models lay out the natural
ebbs and flows of collective violence. This does not hold, for example, for the genocidal violence
against indigenous peoples in colonial settler democracies, nor does it obtain in many other cases
around the world, such as in parts of sub-Saharan Africa or the Middle East. A critical approach
remains skeptical of generalized teleological claims that rest on selective empirical observation,
such as claims that violent conflicts have built-in cycles of escalation and de-escalation24 or that
political reconciliation is achievable through the application of certain sequential strategies. It is
equally skeptical of the existence and application of universal ‘lessons learned’ that can be taken
from one context and applied, with minimal alteration, to substantially different contexts, or even
in the same location but over different historical periods.
A common thread throughout this discussion is the foregrounding of how values, power,
and knowledge are intimately linked. Values such as peace, justice and human rights are always
constituted by power relations, and are at least partly given legitimacy through the knowledge
claims of actors holding a certain status in an epistemic community, such as scholars, government
leaders, and expert practitioners from the global north. Ultimately, a critical approach is oriented
toward interrogating and deconstructing these complex connections between values, power and
knowledge.
Part III
Given the four elements presented above, several critical tasks for prevention follow. This section
identifies a few issue areas that are central to a critical genocide studies approach to prevention.
This list is not meant to be exhaustive. In some cases, a critical approach encourages a shift in our
analytical perspective to focus on the ways in which several dominant assumptions hide important
global power relations and trends that can exacerbate violence. In other cases, the points below
concern deepening or extending claims that are already found in dominant prevention work –
such as privileging the importance of civil society actors – but doing so in ways that may have
transformative effects. If we continue to use the language of a prevention lens, we are asking, what
is in focus, and what remains blurred?
22

Shaw, Genocide and International Relations, 8.

23

G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Part III, sec. 24. For the general critique
see Andrew Woolford, This Benevolent Experiment: Indigenous Boarding Schools, Genocide and Redress in Canada and the
United States (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018); Louise Wise, “Three Colonialisms, the Developmental
State, and the Global-Systemic Constitution of Genocide in Sudan,” International Political Sociology (forthcoming);
Daniel Feierstein, El Genocidio como Práctica Social: Entre el Nazismo y la Experiencia Argentina (Buenos Aires: Fondo
de Cultura Económica de Argentina, 2011); Christopher Powell, Barbaric Civilization: A Critical Sociology of Genocide
(Montreal: McGill-Queens Press, 2011); Damien Short, Redefining Genocide: Settler Colonialism, Social Death and Ecocide
(London: Zed Books, 2016); Mark Levene, The Crisis of Genocide, Volumes I and II (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013).

24

Zartman and de Soto, Timing Mediation Initiatives; Kriesberg and Dayton, Constructive Conflicts. For alternatives, see
Robert Ricigliano, Making Peace Last (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012).
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Global and Regional Contextualization
Prevention must extend its use of global and regional analyses. Shaw underscores the importance
of “complex structural analysis of the local and regional contexts of genocidal violence together
with their insertion into global power relations”25 as a key starting point of prevention thinking.
He has convincingly argued that the sites of genocidal violence have moved across regions of
the world according to historical shifts in global power arrangements caused by colonialism, the
collapse of empires, and the Cold War.26 Prevention today requires greater focus on, and mitigation
of, these large processes of violence displacement by developing and enhancing tools that limit
the military, political and economic overreach of powerful countries. The tendency in prevention
practice of treating countries as discrete, isolated cases risks reproducing a focus on the (very real
and violent) symptoms of regional stresses, fragility and collapse at the expense of examining their
larger structural causes and enablers. This does not mean focusing exclusively on global factors.
Instead, it requires examining systematically the ways in which these factors overwhelm regional,
national and local sources of resilience. Two points follow for prevention purposes:
First, explore how contemporary global political dynamics structure and drive regional and
local violence, including the roles of “wars against terrorism,” struggles among powerful states
and alliances over spheres of influence across Asia, Europe, Latin America, north Africa and the
Middle East, and global economic and environmental/climactic pressures that weaken already
fragile states in the global south.
Ameliorative prevention programs typical of the liberal approach seek to contain national
outbreaks of genocide or mass killings, but often only superficially acknowledge and then ‘bracket
out’ how regional and global power politics can cause or exacerbate localized violence. Instead, the
critique of global power politics should be at the center of atrocity prevention. Atrocity prevention
should directly challenge, for instance, US, Russian, and Chinese foreign policies that serve as
drivers of political violence in different regions, as well as interrogate how the United Nations and
regional governance organizations may legitimize the interests of powerful states in a gambit to
secure their short-term support. Prevention also requires more attention to problems of uneven
global economic integration that can weaken domestic institutions, and how environmental
destabilization can exacerbate local sources of violent conflict where governance institutions
remain weak. At its core, this involves critiquing, and reimagining, what is meant by that empty
signifier, “international community,” that occasionally functions to legitimize violence and the
unequal distribution of global power. As one Nigerian civil society activist pointed out,
The Europeans, and especially the Americans, talk about the terrible violence of African
[jihadi] groups, but don’t ask, ‘how did our own actions in Libya worsen these problems?
How are our own counterterrorism programs across the region encouraging state repression
and harming civil society?’ You can’t really bring this up. They acknowledge it, say yes, yes,
and then move on and talk about problems in your own country and what you should do
about it.27

Second, more attention is needed on how, and under what conditions, violence crosses national
borders. Atrocities are not kept within neat political boundaries. Violence often follows a contagion
effect, spreading to neighboring areas and destabilizing them. The practitioner community is well
aware of this, of course, but cross-national analyses often still privilege one country and involve
assessments of international and transnational dynamics to the extent that those dynamics affect
the primary country. Further research is required for understanding how these violence dynamics
influence one another, and thus what additional prevention strategies are necessary but may be
ignored. Greater attention to regions of violence, and not only country cases, can aid this. Some of
this is already happening: The United States Institute of Peace’s project examining Africa’s Lake
25

Martin Shaw, “The Concept of Genocide: What Are We Preventing?,” in Genocide, Risk and Resilience: An Interdisciplinary
Approach, eds., Bert Ingelaere, et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 31.

Martin Shaw, Genocide and International Relations: Changing Patterns in the Transitions of the Late Modern World
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Chad region - rather than Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon individually or dyadically – is providing
greater insights into how different vectors of violence require different strategies for prevention
and peacebuilding,28 while new research projects analyzing violence in the African Great Lakes
region have helped develop cross-border monitoring and prevention.29 Nevertheless, these types
of studies remain in the minority, thus reinforcing the tendency to see country cases as the default
level of analysis.
Securitization
Atrocity response is shaped by state interests. Political leaders frequently adopt a national security
litmus test to assess the feasibility, and thus value, of prevention in terms of whether it advances
certain core national interests – wealth, power, credibility, and ultimately security – rather than
in terms of some moral compunction to reduce human suffering elsewhere. This approach,
of course, is still with us today: the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) periodic “Worldwide
Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community” is one of the most succinct formulations
of prevention available from a national security perspective. A public summary of the findings
of seventeen intelligence agencies, the 2018 report for instance states that its charge is to provide
intelligence needed to “protect American lives and America’s interests anywhere in the world.”30
It is in this context that “violent – even regime threatening – instability and mass atrocities” are
presented as a danger to core US interests, and thus any prevention work should be carried out
with the aim of advancing, or at least protecting, those interests.31
The national security approach has always been explicit in tying the reduction of human
suffering abroad to promoting core national interests.32 What requires greater parsing is how
since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the liberal approach to atrocity prevention has
become somewhat bifurcated, with one strand becoming heavily influenced by security discourse,
motivations and objectives. A substantial number of intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) still engage in practical and policy-focused atrocity prevention rooted
in liberal norms, but prevention has also been at least partly redefined and instrumentalized
elsewhere as an aspect of national security. Securitization is especially evident in peacebuilding
discussions about the Middle East and North Africa, where the “resurgence of the state-centric
security agenda” has “appropriated peacebuilding,”33 including prevention, though it is not limited
only to this region. The result is a narrowing of what qualifies as peacebuilding, and its conflation
with political stabilization and conflict management.34 The tensions between these two strands of
liberal prevention efforts show no signs of abating.35
An example of this narrowing between security and liberal arguments is found in an influential
genocide prevention report from the Obama era. After noting how genocide is “horrific” and a
“direct assault on universal human values,” Madeline Albright and William Cohen’s Preventing
28
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Genocide states categorically that, “[g]enocide and mass atrocities also threaten core US national
interests.” They go on:
[Genocide and mass atrocities] feed on and fuel other threats in weak and corrupt states,
with dangerous spillover effects that know no boundaries. If the United States does not
engage in preventing these crimes, we inevitably bear greater costs – in feeding millions of
refugees and trying to manage long lasting crises. In addition, US credibility and leadership
are compromised when we fail to work with international partners to prevent genocide and
mass atrocities.36

Preventing Genocide justifies prevention (and intervention) on both humanitarian and national
security grounds. The more recent disturbing trend in some democracies, including in the United
States, toward authoritarian populism and xenophobic, racist politics has shifted prevention
justifications further away from humanitarianism toward national security and counter-terrorism.37
A task of critical prevention work is to interrogate this discursive displacement, which equates
securitization and peacebuilding (including prevention), and examine in detail its practical
consequences. For instance, what are the specific security imperatives that frame powerful states’
selection of atrocity cases and prevention interests? What are the functional consequences of these
choices – that is to say, which cases are left out, and why? How are liberal norms and discourse
appropriated to advance security interests and neutralize radical critiques of state power?
There are also a set of subnational institutional questions around securitization. Governments
are not monolithic, and various government agencies may be at odds with one another in
approaching prevention and human rights advocacy.38 One conflict analyst in the US government
remarked,
The people in State [Department], CIA and Defense [Department], to take just a few examples,
have somewhat different understandings of threats, and thus different priorities. The CIA
and Defense have comparatively narrow understandings of US foreign policy objectives.
State works much more closely with foreign civil society organizations and the UN, but this
puts them in occasional tension with others in our own government. And, the instructions
mid-level State folks receive from the top often conflict with their own best judgment,
especially these days… So, there can be a lot of turf wars, but that also means that there’s a
lot of different opinions on what national security means and the relative weight that should
be given to human rights abroad. There isn’t just one perspective that everyone has.39

Given these internal differences, a number of questions follow: how do various government
agencies understand their prevention portfolios? Who resolves disagreements between competing
prevention priorities, and using what criteria? What are the formal and informal bureaucratic
mechanisms for resolving disputes, and what is kept and what is lost? How can human rights
protection norms be insulated from problematic securitization pressures in policy formulation and
execution?
Broaden the Scope of Violence
Mass killings and fleeing civilians still drive high-level political attention and thus international
prevention priorities. This short-term, reactive approach is certainly a result of media framing,
popular pressure, and the limited attention of decision-makers, but it is not only this; there is
36
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also a deeper theoretical myopia that contributes directly to this problem. Adopting a dialectical
sensitivity to our fundamental concepts encourages us to interrogate dominant formulations of
atrocities and expand the types of harms requiring attention from the prevention community.40
One consequence of a dialectical approach is greater scrutiny of dominant theoretical
formulations of core concepts and their problematic practical consequences. Benjamin Meiches,
for example, has persuasively critiqued the “hegemonic” understanding of genocide – which
emphasizes mass killings above other forms of violence, relatively static collective identity
categories, and an excessively narrow understanding of intentionality – for foreclosing discussions
about what types of violence demand condemnation and what groups of people deserve protection.
For him, the hegemonic understanding “is thus the effort to normalize and depoliticize destructive
processes that do not fit with dominant perceptions about identity, violence, and history.”41 In
essence, the danger is that prominent formulations of our basic concepts (such as genocide) may in
turn minimize the importance of other forms of violence.
For instance, current atrocity prevention work pays little attention to structural violence, those
deeply entrenched and systemic harms against vulnerable populations that are reproduced over
time. This kind of violence is structural because it is woven into a society’s economic, political
and social relations, reaffirmed through formal policies and informal practices, and legitimized
by the norms and values of the broader culture. Structural violence normally appears as a form of
social anomie, where groups live precarious lives marked by high rates of poverty, unemployment,
malnutrition, poor mental health, displacement, emotional and physical insecurity, high mortality
rates, and weakened social bonds.42 It is routinized and thus naturalized – treated as a part of the
given, if lamentable, state of affairs – making it difficult to pinpoint a specific set of responsible
agents, even if its consequences are dire and even genocidal.43 One human rights analyst in the
European Union noted,
Look, we [prevention practitioners] all know that there are a number of long-term, structural
causes to mass atrocities, but in fact we largely focus on actual outbreaks of violence – the
killings, ethnic cleansing, torture, and the like. It is hard to tie in questions of poverty and
long-term discrimination into prevention, except in the most general ways… We don’t have
the resources to do so, but we also frankly don’t always prioritize it. Think of how at the
[UN] Security Council they really started talking about the Rohingya once the killings and
forced displacements got worse.44

And yet it is also precisely its routinization that makes it invisible, except for occasional,
episodic moments when the state employs more explicit violence – killings, torture, disappearances
– to reinforce structures of exclusion and marginalization. Structural violence often occurs over a
much longer time period. This is most apparent in the treatment of indigenous populations in
settler societies, where the process of genocidal attrition occurs over a period spanning decades or
centuries and in some instances continues to this day.45 Crucially, structural violence can also result
in more recent instances of genocide, insofar as the basic conditions of social life are destroyed over
time and the collective identity of the group disappears.
A critical approach, then, requires examining how our dominant concepts of violence
systematically erase certain kinds of harms and experiences, and it also necessitates foregrounding
40
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severe structural violence. It means prioritizing the structural prevention dimension of current
practice by devoting greater attention to how systemic and long-term processes of exploitation,
marginalization, powerlessness and cultural imperialism, to use Iris Marion Young’s terms,46
are linked to the various forms of direct violence that dominate the attention of the prevention
community. It also means moving beyond thinking of these harms merely as precursors to atrocities
and instead seeing them as significant on their own, requiring immediate attention.
Expert opinions, epistemic orthodoxies
Contemporary prevention places a high premium on expert knowledge and technical mastery.
The depth of expertise is indeed substantial, and as discussed earlier, now consists of sophisticated
bodies of knowledge. But the accumulation of this knowledge has come with certain challenges.
The prevention community’s professionalization and, at its most influential levels in the global
north, separation from or selective engagement with local and regional practitioners around the
world, has reinforced an epistemological orthodoxy that occasionally privileges “lessons learned”
approaches, understood as generalized tools from a kit of classifications, procedures and strategies
that can be applied to widely disparate contexts. These lessons learned in turn generate a fair
amount of uniformity in recommended policy solutions and delivery systems.47
Professionalism has also led to the creation of a class of prevention practitioners who have a
great deal of practical mastery of generic prevention tools. This reinforces the general discounting
of local knowledge and actors in conflict zones in favor of applying general lessons learned from
other contexts. The result is the production of expert epistemic communities that remain rarefied
and isolated from local peacebuilders and prevention practitioners. In its more extreme variants,
it produces a disturbing cycle: problems are identified in the global south, they are analyzed,
diagnosed and codified as new doxa in the global north, and finally, experts from the north
recommend treatments to be applied on the south.
The lessons learned problem is not only about types of knowledge, but also tensions generated
in the field. In writing about peacebuilding more generally, Severine Autesserre refers to a
“bubble,” or isolated world of practitioners in conflict zones, as “peaceland,” a place with its “own
time, space and economics,” where “expatriates’ social habits, standard security procedures, and
habitual approaches to collecting information in violence… strongly impact the effectiveness of
intervention efforts.”48 As one Sierra Leonean peace activist told me,
The experts who come from New York and Europe often have little understanding of the
local conflicts here. They don’t go into the villages, don’t travel around the country, don’t
speak any of the local languages. But they know what the problem is and how to fix it,
because maybe they spent time in East Timor, or Guatemala, or maybe Rwanda. They talk to
one another and then they leave, and don’t return until there is another crisis.49

Too strong a focus on technical mastery, unreflective application of lessons from other contexts,
and little time in the field minimize reliance on contextual knowledge and local peace builders,
with detrimental results.
It is important to be clear here: the problem is not expert knowledge or the generation and
use of guidelines and lessons, as such. Nor is this a criticism of particular research methods. Our
understandings of how to improve prevention efforts should be based on rigorous research using a
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broad range of social scientific methods, including qualitative, quantitative and interpretive. These
types of research must be informed – and in turn shaped – by practical findings in the field. The
problem, rather, develops when certain bodies of knowledge becomes a new orthodoxy, reinforced
by the creation of largely closed communities of experts, and remain insulated from critique,
contestation, refinement and even transformation from local expertise and practice.
Civil Society
A critical approach underscores the importance of civil society as a crucial space for advancing
prevention. The term has a long and complex history, but for our purposes civil society refers to
a space of social relations “autonomous from the state where groups and movements create new
alliances, further their interests and views, and engage with one another to shape public and elite
opinion with the aim of influencing state policy and public discourse.”50 It is the social space,
in other words, where the articulation of inclusive, nonviolent values can be advanced, and it
is composed of a wide range of groups.51 Obviously, not all civil society groups or movements
support inclusivity or human rights. The term “civil society” is analytical, not explicitly normative,
as groups may spearhead persecution and otherwise legitimize violence. Myanmar’s Ma Ba
Tha Buddhist extremist organization has encouraged terrorizing Rohingya civilians, a sobering
example of the dangerous side of civil society.52 This phenomenon of violent civil society groups is
well known, and has rightly received plenty of attention from prevention practitioners.
A more systemic problem, however, is the split in the prevention community between, on the
one hand, influential international actors who have limited and selective engagement with local civil
society groups, and on the other, smaller prevention groups that may have stronger connections
to local peacebuilders but lack the ability to influence high-level prevention policy. Too often,
international actors give domestic civil society groups only pro-forma support, with insufficient
engagement with groups as partners and leaders in prevention. Only a small fraction of local civil
society organizations may succeed in establishing linkages with powerful foreign prevention actors,
whether donors, intergovernmental organizations, the UN, other states, or prominent NGOs. The
most successful civil society groups in the global south have comparatively more social capital:
they have members who speak English or French, can navigate the cultural norms of Westerners,
and are capable of formulating their own goals and needs in terms of the criteria and expectations
provided by Western donors, governments and aid agencies. A multivalent approach, however,
encourages greater effort to bring in more activist and local civil society and social movement
organizations into prevention, both in terms of assisting them with resources and training, and also
in enabling them to lead efforts according to their own set of priorities and understandings of local
conflict dynamics.53 Without this, the doxa of the expert risks being reproduced uncritically. A civil
society activist from eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo said,
Groups like ours, which are small and organic [from the community], do a great deal of
peace work on the ground, including around public health, support for women and girls,
and conflict resolution. We also have informal connections to other organizations around
the [provinces of the] Kivus and even in neighboring countries. There are many alliances
like this, but we remain invisible to the UN and big donors because we are seen as too small
and we have difficulty getting their attention. Also, sometimes we are most critical of the
Ernesto Verdeja, Unchopping A Tree: Reconciliation in the Aftermath of Political Violence (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 2009), 138.
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government security forces, and this can cause problems for outsiders who see Kinshasa as
a partner.54

Civil society groups can be important sources of prevention and restraint in a variety of
ways, and the prevention community needs to cultivate and encourage this more extensively.
Their contributions are varied, and may include protecting vulnerable populations, monitoring
and reporting abuses, advocating human rights, nondiscrimination and peaceful coexistence in
ways that are culturally rooted and resonant beyond formal legal norms or government policies,
creating solidarity movements by building and extending networks of like-minded organizations,
and, pressuring political leaders to change policies.55 More contentiously, some groups may
advance peacebuilding by openly critiquing and resisting narratives that emphasize difference and
dehumanization of vulnerable populations, identifying and condemning discriminatory practices
by the government or others, shaming perpetrators and supporters of violence, and pressuring
bystanders to be actively engaged in defending rights.
This list of contributions is well supported by empirical research.56 However, it still falls
largely within a liberal paradigm typical of mainstream prevention work, anchored in standard
political and civil rights and secured by advancing values such as tolerance and respect for the
rule of law. All of this, of course, is important. But a critical perspective significantly expands
the role for civil society. Civil society groups are well positioned, for instance, to engage in much
more uncomfortable, but often necessary, public debate examining how a country’s founding
principles of self-rule and governance, as well as its origin myths and ‘settled’ histories, may be
implicated in the sustained exclusion and oppression of minority groups from the past through
the present. This can entail contesting dominant understandings of collective identity in deeply
divided societies, challenging conceptions of political reconciliation that reproduce the values and
self-understandings of majority groups, and opening a space for reimagining what a just shared
future may look like. For instance, in indigenous communities in settler colonial democracies like
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, contesting the very terms of national
membership – who are ‘we, the people’ – raises profound issue about the limitations of modern
configurations of sovereignty. To mark collective identity and the terms of reconciliation as
politically off limits because of its possible disruptions risks perpetuating the symbolic violence
and erasure that is a constitutive part of collective harms.57
A critical approach to civil society underscores the need to include radical peaceful social
movements that often remain marginalized, resisted or otherwise ignored by mainstream
prevention actors because of what they have to say and how they say it.58 Such an engagement
goes well beyond short- and mid-term causes of atrocities and draws attention to the narratives
and values that legitimize continued domination of vulnerable peoples.
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Conclusion
Practitioners and scholars have made enormous advances in understanding the warning signs of
impending atrocities, the primary causes of mass violence, and the appropriate combination of
responses. The maturation of the prevention field over the past two decades is indeed impressive.
However, as this article has discussed, there are several areas where a critical approach can
contribute to ongoing prevention work. These include problematizing the “bracketing” of
global and regional contextualization that results in treating the nation-state as an analytical
monad, examining the problem of securitization and connections to state power, pushing for an
expansion of the kinds of violence under the purview of prevention, identifying the consequences
of privileging expert knowledge, and noting the limitations of global north engagements with
local actors.
In essence, the critical approach presses several questions: prevention for whom (who is
designated a worthy victim, who is not), prevention of what (what harms are worthy of response,
what forms of life qualify for protection), and why prevention (whose interests and voices determine
which cases meet the threshold of response)? In answering these questions, we get a better sense of
the selective nature of the when, where and how of actual prevention efforts.
In some situations, a critical approach involves deepening efforts that are already in place,
or at least acknowledged as important, even if they are pursued only in the breach. In others, the
approach laid out here encourages a more radical change in prevention work, calling on rethinking
– and contesting – the boundaries of what is the appropriate scope of prevention by asking what is
left out. Given ongoing violence across many regions of the world, this work is all the more urgent.
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